Dark matter remains undetected in the laboratory. This has been true for forever, so I don’t know what drives the timing of the recent spate of articles encouraging us to keep the faith, that dark matter is still a better idea than anything else. This depends on how we define “better.” There is a long-standing debate in the philosophy of science about the relative merits of accommodation and prediction.

Avi Loeb has a nice recent post Recalculating Academia , in which he discusses some of the issues confronting modern academia. One of the reasons I haven’t written here for a couple of months is despondency over the same problems. If you’re here reading this, you’ll likely be interested in what he has to say. I am not eager to write at length today, but I do want to amplify some of the examples he gives with my own experience.

The fine-tuning problem encountered by dark matter models that I talked about last time is generic. The knee-jerk reaction of most workers seems to be “let’s build a more sophisticated model.” That’s reasonable – if there is any hope of recovery. The attitude is that dark matter has to be right so something has to work out. This fails to even contemplate the existential challenge that the fine-tuning problem imposes.

OK, basic review is over. Shit’s gonna get real. Here I give a short recounting of the primary reason I came to doubt the dark matter paradigm. This is entirely conventional – my concern about the viability of dark matter is a contradiction within its own context. It had nothing to do with MOND, which I was blissfully ignorant of when I ran head-long into this problem in 1994.

In order to agree on an interpretation, we first have to agree on the facts. Even when we agree on the facts, the available set of facts may admit multiple interpretations.

There is a rule of thumb in scientific publication that if a title is posed a question, the answer is no. It sucks being so far ahead of the field that I get to watch people repeat the mistakes I made (or almost made) and warned against long ago. There have been persistent claims of deviations of one sort or another from the Baryonic Tully-Fisher relation (BTFR). So far, these have all been obviously wrong, for reasons we’ve discussed before.

Science progresses through hypothesis testing. The primary mechanism for distinguishing between hypotheses is predictive power. The hypothesis that can predict new phenomena is “better.” This is especially true for surprising, a priori predictions: it matters more when the new phenomena was not expected in the context of an existing paradigm. I’ve seen this happen many times now. MOND has had many predictive successes.

A surprising and ultimately career-altering result that I encountered while in my first postdoc was that low surface brightness galaxies fell precisely on the Tully-Fisher relation. This surprising result led me to test the limits of the relation in every conceivable way. Are there galaxies that fall off it? How far is it applicable?

Human intuition for probability may not be as ‘biased’ as behavioral economists think.

I read somewhere – I don’t think it was Kuhn himself, but someone analyzing Kuhn – that there came a point in the history of science where there was a divergence between scientists, with different scientists disagreeing about what counts as a theory, what counts as a test of a theory, what even counts as evidence. We have reached that point with the mass discrepancy problem.